Possible Worlds, Zombies, and Truth Machines by Mehmedovic, Mirza
Mirza Mehmedović
262
GdM 1/2016   262-283
Mirza Mehmedović
Possible Worlds, Zombies and Truth Machines
1. What does it mean to have a zombie twin? 
In philosophical terms a twin zombie (TZ) is an individual identical to a 
conscious human being, in this case it is my/your identical twin, but without 
conscious experience such as the perception of color and scent. It is not an in-
dividual that actually exists in the universe, but rather a possible individual, i.e. 
a subject which has all the other characteristics of the actual universe. In other 
words, a TZ is a possible individual micro-physically identical to me and at the 
same time devoid of conscious experience. As Iris Murdoch wrote1 in a discus-
sion on behaviorism, “all is silent and dark within.” It should also be added that 
while a TZ differs from me only due to its lack of conscious experience, its ob-
servable behavior is nonetheless identical to mine; a TZ answers questions and 
acts in an apparently rational manner in the surrounding environment. In the 
end, if we admit that a zombie is a coherently conceived “object,” by extending 
this reasoning further, it is possible to imagine worlds inhabited by zombies 
where there is no consciousness.
One of the premises of the zombie argument is that the conceivability of 
zombies implies their metaphysical possibility2. The topic of the conceivabil-
ity of zombies comes as a logical consequence of the idea developed by David 
Chalmers3 in “The Conscious Mind” indicating that there are certain features 
of reality which are not reducible to physical properties. If proven true, this ar-
gument (or supervenience argument) falsifies physicalism4, the doctrine which 
holds that all properties of a superior level in respect to the base properties 
1 I. Murdoch, The Sovereignty of Good, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1970, p. 13.
2 D. J. Chalmers, Does conceivability Entail Possibility?, in T. Gendler - J. Hawthorne (ed.), 
Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, pp.145-200.
3 Id., The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press, New 
York 1996.
4 Physicalism is a philosophical doctrine introduced, among others, by the Austrian philosopher 
Otto Neurath. See: Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science, in J. Symons - O. Pombo - J. Manuel Torres 
(eds.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science 18, Springer, Dordrecht 2011.
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which are described by physics, are ultimately reducible to the latter according 
to certain principles of reduction or “bridge laws”. Conversely, Daniel Stoljar 
notes5 that if physicalism is characterized as the doctrine that, “for any subjects 
S and S* and worlds W and W*, if S in W and S* in W* are physically identical, 
then they are psychologically identical;”6 so if this doctrine is true, then it is 
impossible for me to have a twin zombie. 
Chalmers7, along with a number of authors8, openly supports the con-
sistency of zombies; while others9, including Eric Marcus10 and Robert Kirk11, 
have attempted to demonstrate that zombies are logically impossible via vari-
ous arguments. For example, Stoljar notes12 that physicalists generally deny that 
conceivability is a sure guide to the possibility. (Towards the end of this paper, 
after presenting my argument, I comment on one of these criticisms around the 
conceivability of zombies, namely that of Robert Kirk, explaining why in my 
opinion it does not completely hit the mark.)
1.2. Supervenience and types of supervenience
David Chalmers featured two types of supervenience: “logical,” that 
is characterized as being metaphysically necessary or necessary in all possible 
worlds, and “natural” supervenience which we can also call “contingent” super-
venience. According to Chalmers, consciousness is a contingently supervenient 
(i.e. naturally supervenient) feature of real individuals, to the extent that the 
individuals of this universe are real biological systems with conscious experi-
ence; but not logically supervenient since it is conceivable a consistent world, 
5 D. Stoljar, The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical, in «Philosophical 
Perspectives» 15(2001), pp. 393-413.
6 Ibi, p. 393.
7 D.J. Chalmers, The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism, in The Character of 
Consciousness, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford 2010.
8 N. Block, On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness, in «Behavioral and Brain Sciences» 
18(1995), pp. 227-247; N. Block, The Harder Problem of Consciousness, in «Journal of Philosophy» 
99(2002), pp 391-425; J. Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford-New York 2001.
9 For a review of the critiques see: http://consc.net/responses.html 
10 E. Marcus, Why Zombies are Inconceivable, in «Australasian Journal of Philosophy» 3(2004), 
pp. 477-490.
11 R. Kirk, Why There Couldn’t Be Zombies, in «Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society» 
Supplementary Volume 73(1999), pp. 1-16; see also: K. Frankish, The anti-zombie argument, in 
«Philosophical Quarterly» 57(2007), pp. 650-666.
12 D. Stoljar, The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical, cit., p. 394.
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physically identical to ours, but in which individuals would have no conscious 
experience. Let us see what this means.
According to the general definition provided by Chalmers13, “superveni-
ence” is a relationship between two sets of properties. The higher-level proper-
ties (or HLPs) are supervenient over the properties of the basic, or lower level 
(LLPs). The LLPs that usually are taken into account are those basic to physics 
which, based on the physicalistic approach, tend to determinate all the HLPs 
from those of biology or chemistry. A stricter definition states that the HLPs 
are supervenient over LLPs if there are not two identical situations in respect to 
the LLPs but that differ with respect to the HLPs. Thus, if we speak of complex 
organisms, we will say that any two objects with the same physical properties 
are also biologically identical (i.e. indiscernible14). Moreover, since the proper-
ties covered by biology do not have a distinct ontological problem, in this case 
it could be stated that the relationship between LLPs and HLP, if true, is true 
in all possible worlds.
However, as we said it is possible to distinguish two types of superveni-
ence, which roughly correspond to two kinds of relationships between sets of 
properties. The logical supervenience applies to those HLPs that are reducible 
to the LLPs in all possible worlds. In other words, it is not possible to imagine a 
situation where that type of relationship would not be valid or may differ with 
respect to some element, for example, it is said to be metaphysically impossible 
(not even God could do it) for male hens to exist. This defines the relationship 
of logical supervenience in terms of a posteriori necessary identities. For exam-
ple, knowing that “water is H2O” is true, assuming this as an a posteriori iden-
tity, we come to the conclusion that worlds in which water is not H2O (Saul 
Kripke’s argument15) are not possible. The same goes for known identities such 
as “Hesperus is Phosphorus” or “Tullius is Cicero”. As for the example of hens, 
we say that a hen has a kind of internal structure discovered a posteriori thereby 
fixing the reference to the term “hen” in all possible worlds. The same generally 
applies in nature to all the natural kinds16. (We are obviously not interested in 
13 D.J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, cit., pp. 30 ss.
14 D. Lewis, Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge University Press, New York 1999; 
On Lewis’ materialist thought, see: S. Guttenplan, A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell 
Publishers, Oxford 1994.
15 S.A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford 1972.
16 S.A. Kripke, Reference and Existence. The John Locke Lectures, Oxford University Press, 
New York 2013. Kripke also argues that the names of imaginary beings are not real names, but only 
“pretended names”, since these names do not apply to things having a discernible internal structure 
(names of mythological animals as “Unicorn” or “Pegasus” have no reference tout court).
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going into depth about the reference problems usually discussed, as in some 
counterfactual situations where such names could not refer to the same object.)
Chalmers correctly says that logical supervenience is stronger than natural 
supervenience and that the latter is characteristic of a subset containing the set 
of objects that satisfy the occurrence of the stronger type. The more interest-
ing epistemological argument captures the intuition that natural supervenience 
(that which always and systematically occurs in the form of a close correlation 
between property sets) leaves room for alternatives not currently realized or 
realizable.
The clearest example used by Chalmers is the equation of the state of per-
fect gases, according to which we know that the pressure exerted by one mole 
of a gas depends on the temperature and occupied volume. Knowing the tem-
perature (T) and occupied volume (V), we can always determine the pressure 
(p) exerted by the gas; arriving at the equation of pV = nRT, where (R) is a 
certain constant. Chalmers notes17 that this law only correlates in respect to the 
facts of nature currently observable and that with a slightly higher or lower R 
which is equal to other factors (temperature and volume), the pressure would 
be different. Similarly, we say that it is logically possible for two cubes to exist; 
one made of gold and the other of uranium-235, both measuring a kilometer 
on each side, yet we also know that this is impossible in nature due to the in-
stability of the uranium-235 atoms. Therefore, it is generally stated that logical 
possibilities include natural ones but not vice versa. So although it is possible for 
a thousand monkeys to type out Hamlet, it is extremely unlikely that they will 
actually succeed.
The problem that now presents itself is how to determine which category 
of supervenience is within experience; that is, what is the nature of the phe-
nomenon of “consciousness”. Entering into the merits of the problem of mind-
brain identity, Chalmers states that the case of consciousness does not seem to 
fit in cases of logical supervenience; that is, in relation to an a posteriori neces-
sary identity between sets of properties, for which we have the basic properties 
of physical reality in one set and properties of conscious experience in the other 
(as in the subjective experience of colors or flavors). Rather, Chalmers contin-
ues, it seems that consciousness is only naturally supervenient. This is true, but 
it is not necessarily true that bodies like ours have conscious experience. Logi-
cally speaking, there may be worlds in which (with the same physical, biological 
and psychological properties that do not present problems of ontological re-
ducibility to physical characterization) there would be no conscious experience.
17 D.J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, cit., p. 33.
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1.3. Supervenience and mind-body identity
The irreducible problem that philosophy of mind raises, according to 
Chalmers, is when we attempt to treat consciousness in physicalistic terms18. 
The key issue under discussion is that the characteristics of consciousness, 
namely qualia, do not seem in any way necessarily supervenient to the char-
acteristics of biological and physical individuals in the real world. In a sense 
it is trivially true that a real individual in normal conditions has conscious 
experience. Nevertheless, this does not seem to go beyond the mere finding 
that our physical organization (namely our cortical tissue) implements the 
conscious experience. But as suggested, things could have gone differently, so 
that we might have developed a modular 3D brain-like cortical tissue, con-
structed with a silk protein-based scaffold, ECM composite and primary cor-
tical neurons. On this point Chalmers states one of his most controversial 
theses; since there is no strong scientific reason for stating (as an a posteriori 
necessary truth) that the properties of consciousness are logically supervenient 
to our biological and, ultimately, physical characteristics. However, it is con-
sistent to imagine possible worlds in which individuals identical to us would 
be completely devoid of conscious experience19. The type of conceptual con-
sistency that Chalmers calls into play is analogous to the recognition of a pos-
sible world where “water” (that watery stuff, the colorless liquid that fills the 
oceans) would prove to be “XYZ” instead of “H2O”. It is essentially the ability 
to conceive non-standard realizations of our functional20, organizational char-
acteristics. Therefore, if alternative material characterizations are conceivable 
18 It should keep in mind that the term consciousness is used to uniquely identify the conscious 
experiences with phenomenal properties, such as colors, shapes, sounds and so on. The broader concept 
“mind” is used to designate the set of cognitive processes (both conscious and unconscious).
19 Ibi, pp. 84-88.
20 See the classical thought experiment described by: N. Block, Troubles with functionalism, in 
C.W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundation of Psychology, University of Min-
nesota Press, Minneapolis 1978. Reprinted in N. Block, Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1980. Block imagines what would happen if the functional 
organization of the brain was reproduced by the entire Chinese population, where each inhabitant cor-
responded to a neuron and each radio link to a synapse. This type of experiment, however, is not new. 
Leibniz in his Monadologie imagined what would happen if we had a huge machine structurally capable 
of thinking, in which we can get in as in a mill. In both cases the underlying idea is that – apart from the 
gears or the elements constitutive of the organization of the physical system in question – from any par-
ticular material condition would (logically) follow that that system would necessarily be conscious. We 
would not find anything in it that explains subjective experience; See G.W. Leibniz, Monadologie (1714).
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for certain primary intensions21, then the relationship between primary inten-
sions and extensions appears to be contingent.
The problem is that while we have an idea of  the criterion by which we 
would test whether the liquid in question is H2O or XYZ, in the case of zom-
bies, that seems more controversial. Is it possible to think of a way in which 
we could, rather than simply reaffirm that zombies seem logically consistent, 
strengthen or weaken this conviction on the basis of certain other basic beliefs 
about our relationship with reality and other minds? This is what I propose to 
verify. I will do so by adopting a common strategy; a thought experiment that 
evaluates the logical possibility of zombies in a possible world. In particular, I 
will assess what might happen in one of these possible worlds if a principle of 
accessibility, i.e. an epistemic window on a possible world, were applied.
2. Possible worlds and accessibility criteria
For the moment I assume that the conceivability (the logical possibility) 
of zombies is consistent. I also assume that a zombie universe is conceivable 
and logically consistent. The point, however understandable, is not whether 
zombies are logically consistent per se, but if there is room for maneuver regard-
ing their conceivability, that there be sufficient room to enable us to somehow 
assess the epistemological consequences that would arise from the relationship 
of possible worlds to extensions. Imagine therefore that you have to introduce 
some intra-world accessibility condition that allows you to operate logically 
and epistemologically on counterfactuals22. In the case of Kripkean counter-
factuals we know that the criterion of accessibility is given by the fact that the 
counterfactuals are possibilities nominally determined in relation to the real 
world. Expressions like “could have been otherwise” refers to well-designed 
possibilities that describe circumstances historically not realized due to items 
that historically existed or are still in existence. 
21 Primary intensions of “water”, for example, are: “colorless liquid that fills the oceans and 
quenches” (Kripke’s flaccid designators for instance). Then there are the “secondary intensions” as 
“H2O”, “79Au” or “XYZ” (in a counterfactual), which form the a posteriori necessary identities. See: D.J. 
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, cit., pp. 50-62.
22 We usually talk about “operators” who select objects in different possible worlds. For a logical-
metaphysical talk on operators see: D. Lewis, Counterfactuals, Blackwell Publishers, Malden (MA) 1973. 
A more intuitive way of thinking about accessibility to alternative worlds is described in Hilary Putnam’s 
famous Twin Earth thought experiment (1975), that originally thinks to counterfactuals as to far away 
places that simply exist in the actual universe.
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So what kind of criterion of accessibility is required to evaluate the con-
cept of a zombie universe? One could accept a zombie universe merely as a type 
of possible maximal23 universe where there isn’t any consciousness and where 
organisms identical to us both physically and behaviorally could exist. I believe 
there would be nothing inconsistent if at some point we also imagined the crea-
tion of an epistemic bridge to such a possible world; in which case, we could 
then further extrapolate the events in this universe following the arrival of an 
astrophysicist with an “infallible” truth machine24. At the time of his arrival, 
the consciousness of the astrophysicist would be the only consciousness in a 
so-conceived universe. Hypothetically, he knows he is in a zombie universe but 
wants to see if what is experienced in his window is actually consistent and 
corresponds in some way to the truth and not to a contradiction. I am now 
in position to describe a possible interaction between a conscious individual 
and others, who by assumption are zombies. What might happen isn’t hard to 
imagine; the astrophysicist could decide to study individuals of this universe by 
posing a few questions using the infallible truth machine.
The astrophysicist could devise the simplest of questions to assess the 
zombies’ responses against that of the truth machine (T-M). The question ad-
dressed to the Z-Chalmers (i.e. the hypothetical Chalmers’ zombie twin that 
the astrophysicist could potentially meet) is, “Are you a zombie?”. From that 
question four possible scenarios emerge corresponding to the responses re-
ceived from the zombie and the truth machine as shown below:
Zombie’s answers Yes, I am a zombie No, I am not a zombie
T-M proves true  A  B
T-M proves false ¬A ¬B
An important premise must precede this examination; the zombie should 
conceivably interact with the astrophysicist. In this case it is essential for the 
zombie to understand the traveler’s questions from the start. However, this as-
sumption alone leads to the most problematic logical-phenomenological con-
sequences for the conceivability argument. 
23 A “maximal universe” is a causally closed universe.
24 Try to think of something similar to what is described in J.L. Halperin’s The Truth Machine: A 
Speculative Novel (1996). An infallible truth machine is (at least) positively conceivable.
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Case A
Z-Chalmers answers: “Yes, I’m a zombie.” The machine checks and gives the 
output: “True.” 
How should we evaluate the first case? Might we have some reason not 
to believe Z-Chalmers? In particular, would we have any objective reason to 
contradict both the individual and the T-M in question, which hypothetically 
we know to be infallible? We know that Z-Chalmers is supposedly identical 
to Chalmers and speaks the same language of the traveler except for the fact 
that, according to the premises, Z-Chalmers has no conscious experience. The 
T-M, therefore, cannot fail the exam. Which is, at least at first, reasonable to 
believe if we accept the approach of the thought experiment, together with its 
consequences, thereby giving no objective reason to doubt that Z-Chalmers is 
(or would be) what he says to be. The problem is that the objective reasons 
brought into play by no means exhaust all the options. In particular there is the 
next logical problem; assuming that Z-Chalmers is telling the truth, according 
to the machine, how can we evaluate the concept of “truth” for Z-Chalmers. 
What, in other words, does the statement, “Yes, I’m a zombie” mean to Z-Chal-
mers? The semantic content of the statement corresponds to something like, 
“Yes, I am an individual identical to Chalmers, but devoid of conscious experi-
ence”. The question is, could Z-Chalmers be engaged in individual observation 
around the content of this truth? I think the answer is clearly, no!
What is strictly required in order to allow Z-Chalmers make this kind 
of statement with a full sense of completion is that, in the least, 1) he assumes 
a phenomenal perspective on his own condition, and 2) the answer is will-
ingly uttered, i.e. with the aim of stating something that he has semantically 
understood. Neither of the two conditions can be eliminated because the type 
of answer given properly concerns a fact of phenomenal consciousness, i.e. in-
tentional recognition of his subjective condition. Z-Chalmers cannot satisfy 
the conditions 1 and 2. As a result, Z-Chalmers in principle cannot articulate 
meaningful utterances sensitive to the common concept of truth. The discrep-
ancy between the content of truth and the hypothetical state of affairs are evi-
dently in contradiction.
The only other counterfactual “experience” in which a similar situation 
could recur subject to the conditions on the absence of conscious experience 
is one in which Z-Chalmers would be a well thought out android robot (say 
R-Chalmers). But in this case we would state that R-Chalmers does not under-
stand what it says and that it provides automated responses based on sophisti-




Z-Chalmers says: “No, I am not a zombie.” The machine confirms: “True.”
How could this second case be evaluated? Are there objective reasons to 
doubt what Z-Chalmers says? Also in this case there seems to be no immediate 
objective reason for doubt. The machine is infallible as in the first case (with 
respect to the evaluation of the physiological responses of the individual) and 
we assume according to the principle of interpretative charity that Z-Chalmers 
is telling the truth. From the point of view of our basic epistemic commitments, 
there does not seem to be any conflict whatsoever. We are epistemically ready 
to recognize in the hypothetical condition of case B a situation in which the 
premise is false; that is, that it was in effect a zombie universe.
But what about the logical-phenomenological problem that emerges from 
this case? We reasonably have two possibilities. For the first we would have to 
admit the existence of such a counterfactual and the possibility of finding indi-
viduals identical to us (yet without conscious experience); however, the general 
premise is that this would not be the case, which is not a trivial problem. If the 
zombie tells the truth, then either there is sufficient reason to prove the premise 
or we deny the conclusion which is in contradiction with the premise. But why 
should we have to accept the premise that this would (in any case) be a zombie 
universe? I think someone could assess the following additional condition; true 
propositions expressed by Z-Chalmers overlook the epistemic condition, i.e. 
its (Z-Chalmer’s) epistemic commitments (affirmation of the premise). This, 
however, would reasonably mean very little because in that case the traveler 
would be the only capable of semantically evaluating the statements and we 
would have the additional problem of defining the conditions of possibility for 
the evaluation of semantic content proffered by an individual of the zombie 
universe. If Z-Chalmers does not intend to express a minimum core of condi-
tions that justify its utterances, the experiment is empty of meaning and not 
consistently proving that Z-Chalmers would be possible. The second case also 
seems to fall within the limited range of a well-programmed robot.
Case C
Z-Chalmers says, “Yes, I’m a zombie,” but the machine proves the statement 
as “false.”
In this third case there seems to be at least one objective reason to assert 
that the premise is not consistently qualified. We know that the truth machine 
is infallible and, based on this premise, we can admit that Z-Chalmers lied. But 
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what is the condition for which we would admit that Z-Chalmers would have 
lied in a so-described condition? The most reasonable solution, directly conse-
quent to the introduction of the thought experiment, is that the physiological 
responses of Z-Chalmers would be somehow connected with the intention of 
providing an answer that has a content (true or false as it may be). Furthermore, 
one would say that this would confirm our intuition that the minimum neces-
sary conditions are present for the utterance of true/false statements and that 
these conditions are related to the intentional character of subjectivity. As in 
the other two cases, this could also be a case in which the experiment would be 
misleading by virtue of the fact that Z-Chalmers could be a robot. All the same, 
this would not be the case in a zombie universe. 
Case D
Z-Chalmers says, “No, I am not a zombie.” The machine emits the output, 
“false.”
Here there is an even more obvious immediate contradiction between the 
objective condition (the response of the machine and the zombie’s response) 
which can be observed as neither objective nor subjective. But even if the re-
sponse of the zombie were evaluated as an objective condition, it would have 
no effect on the experiment. The reason for this can be well illustrated. We 
know that the machine evaluates the physiological condition of the individual 
in question. But then the simplest assessment is that Z-Chalmers is somehow 
responsible for the utterance of a content of truth, all the same he knows he 
is lying, so the machine confirms a “false.” Conclusion: either Z-Chalmers is 
not a zombie or he doesn’t know he is lying; but then there is a logical conflict 
between the minimal epistemic conditions for expressing a rational content. 
(Remember here that one of the preconditions is that the zombie can provide 
answers because he is behaviorally identical to us and speaks our language.) It 
seems that the premise of the experiment tends, in all four cases, to invalidate 
the idea that Z-Chalmers is logically consistent, which is what I proposed to 
assess rigorously.
Even in the latter case there is the spectre of the robot. A robot could be 
so well-designed that it could falsify the experiment. In case D, the robot could 
have given an emotional response that falsifies the experiment, but this would 
only be admissible regardless of further logical evaluations that we would feel 
the need to put into play. We know that the case of the robot is not admissible, 
and any other case seems to disconfirm the conceivability of the zombie.
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3. Intentionality, epistemic commitments and semantic contents
At this point, some or perhaps all the supporters of the zombie conceivabil-
ity may argue that this mental experiment dramatically forces the assumption 
of logical conceivability. In particular it may be asserted that it is unnecessary 
to evaluate the boundary conditions of the statement that acknowledges the 
existence of “individuals identical to us and unconscious” (formally “P˄¬Q”)25. 
If “P˄¬Q” is assumed logically consistent, then it is metaphysically possible. 
However, we could argue that the mere assertion of consistency is very little to 
lay on the table in order to state, while denying the contradictions, that zom-
bies are logically consistent. The epistemic conditions are inevitably raised, 
from the semantic interpretation of “P˄¬Q,” i.e. by the idea itself expressed in 
“individuals identical to us and unconscious.”
The question just posed cannot be bypassed without evaluating, with an 
epistemic window, the implications intuitively raised from the main premise. 
This can be put another way, reiterating what Kripke admits about the meta-
physical consequences of a purely epistemological evaluation. It is clear that 
the epistemic conditions inevitably emerge from the semantic interpretation 
of “P˄¬Q,” i.e. from the idea itself expressed in “individuals identical to us and 
unconscious.” Scientifically significant discoveries of physics or other sciences, 
whose domain of objects is given by the set of properties closely supervening to 
those of physics, have metaphysical and not trivial consequences; thus it is in 
the already described case of the discovery that the “internal” structure of water 
is H2O. This discovery necessarily fixes a posteriori the reference, in the worlds 
in which there is H2O, and we will say that, “water is H2O.”
Similarly, the epistemic window open in this experiment, although there 
are no such similar conditions (in the sense that we do not have zombies at 
hand), is needed to enable us to evaluate the minimum conditions of the in-
tuition that there may be some “P˄¬Q.” Such an epistemic window should 
provide room for maneuver to evaluate the consistency of zombies. But it seems 
that such a window gives rise to issues generated from the evaluation of the 
logical-phenomenological radical meaning of subjectivity, i.e. the minimum 
core that conditions the conceivability of situations in which it would make 
sense (i.e. would be consistent) to evaluate the utterances deemed rational for 
an individual “P˄¬Q.” The epistemic window suggested basically coincides 
with the field of meaning available when interacting with other people. In ad-
25 Cf. D.J. Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness, Oxford University Press, New York 2010.
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dition, we believe (at least I do) that the assessment of the content of meaning 
presupposes the epistemic responsibility on the contents themselves. We will 
simply say that it is logically consistent that a person identical to us can take 
epistemic responsibility for what they state, unless one of the following condi-
tions is not satisfied (separately), 1) the individual has a point of view which 
reflects what they say, and in that case can affirm a true or false response, or 
2) the individual says things that are meaningless for them as they are devoid 
of consciousness (although the given statement might make sense to us, i.e. to 
conscious beings), or 3) the case is fallacious because we are dealing with an 
impostor, or robot in this case. 
It is clear that the second case is the most controversial. However, it is dif-
ficult to imagine a case where a zombie could coherently articulate meaningful 
sentences, intentionally designed to express a condition based on the evalua-
tion of a specific question, apart from taking some of the rationally accepted 
core epistemic commitments, which determine a kind of individual responsi-
bility in cognitive and rational terms. In other words, it is difficult to accept 
the zombie’s answers and take an epistemic commitment such as, “everything 
is dark and silent within.” This seems to go against our most basic intuitions 
or, if you like, against the minimum evaluative (rational) schemas constructed 
on the base of our cognitive system. Given these difficulties, my conclusion is 
that zombies are logically impossible, because zombies do not pass such a test of 
consistency and truth.
4. Other epistemic windows
In his article (1999)26, Robert Kirk developed a kind of experiment to 
evaluate the logical conceivability of zombies, and his conclusions do not dif-
fer much from the present method although his experiment presents a fallacy 
that I would now like to comment on. Kirk’s experiment bets everything on 
the implications that result from a window of evaluation based on a cognitive 
situation. The experiment is simple and there is no need to fully reconstruct 
the logical setting of the premises of the experiment itself. Kirk evaluates the 
fundamental point expressed by those defending the conceivability of zom-
bies, which is represented by the Cartesian idea that we are not identical to our 
body; hence, not being identical to the body in their view means, “I consist of 
26 R. Kirk, Why There Couldn’t Be Zombies, cit.
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my body, my ‘zombie companion,’ we might call it, combined with my non-
physical qualia.”
Kirk introduces his objection at this point asking, “Can this compound 
tell the difference between, for example, the smell of tea and the smell of coffee? 
Of course it can discriminate the two smells – my zombie twin can do that - but 
this is not the point. The question is: can it tell the difference between the ‘sub-
jective character’ of the smells, between their qualia?” This further opens, so to 
speak, the epistemic window. Kirk comes to the following conclusions and says, 
“Being able to tell the difference in that sense requires being able to detect to 
alleged non-physical qualia in the first place: and that requires, as an absolute 
minimum, being sensitive to, or affected by, them. We already know the zom-
bie is insensitive to anything non-physical, so cannot detect non-physical qualia 
or differences between them. The next thing to notice is that qualia cannot 
detect such differences either. Qualia are, at best, that between which there are 
differences to be detected; they cannot also be that which does the detecting.”27 
The point is clear enough. Kirk raises the question that we are not just the 
sum of a physical body plus the qualia. This is quite evident from the idea which 
keeps the two components separated as a premise and connects them, suddenly, 
in order to assess what (in principle) could happen. Kirk’s epistemic window 
seems to necessitate the recomposition of the individual and presupposes the 
capability of the body. Then, to Kirk’s conclusion we have to consider Chalm-
ers’ theoretical position on supervenience28 which is also attributed to inten-
tionality, yet not to the ability to have phenomenal experiences of any type in 
order to assess the qualia. But the premise is that the zombie cannot assess non-
physical elements by comparing them with each other in their specific intrinsic 
qualities; therefore, since it seems impossible to reconstruct the individual from 
the two separate sets of elements, one must reject the premise that, as they are 
usually defined, zombies are logically consistent.
The other point is that the qualia cannot influence the zombie to provide 
an independent evaluative window (as if the qualia to be evaluated were able to 
self-evaluate in some way and give zombies a package of differences or intrinsic 
values). The value of the differences is somehow rated by the subject and that, 
according to Kirk (and according to me), requires the ability to cognitively eval-
uate the so-given values . Otherwise, if the zombie were to judge the differences 
regardless of “sensitivity” to the differences, the case would clearly be nonsensi-
cal. (Returning for a moment to my point, what Kirk says is very reasonable, 
27 Ibi, p. 7.
28 D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, cit., pp. 74-75.
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but what he does not say is even more reasonable; i.e. the intentional evaluative 
attitude/behavior is an inviolable core of subjectivity. In other words, my ho-
rizon of meaning is inherently evaluative from the simple sensation of “feeling 
myself”, whatever that means. What I would like to emphasize in particular, 
also in the case I present, is the idea that if there are sufficient grounds to ad-
mit “as significant” the declarative sentences uttered by an individual, then the 
zombie conceivability suffers a formal defect, given ab origine by the idea of 
curbing ontologically only the qualia. So, from the point of view of a rational 
observer evaluating the specific case of “P˄¬Q,” the idea of  zombies should in 
any case be logically unsatisfactory.)
As a result, what does not work very well in Kirk’s experiment is the fact of 
granting zombies and qualia the possibility to be reunited. We know of limit-
cases in which it would be openly consistent to join together a partial zombie 
with his qualia. This is the case, for example, in individuals who have regained 
their sight. In such cases, the individuals do not recognize the difference be-
tween the perceived sensations such as colors. But in the long run, a blind man 
who has regained his sight will be able to cognitively evaluate the relevant dif-
ferences, for example, between the sensation of the colors red and gray. The 
problem with Kirk’s experiment is that it has a premise, recognized even by sup-
porters of zombies, that we do not know what constitutes this “conjunction.” 
Therefore, it cannot be a priori excluded that it is not sufficient to operate the 
mere separation of the various features of the human body and qualia, just as 
you cannot know in advance whether this operation of reverse reductionism 
suffers from an inherent fallacy29.
5. Intentionality and metaphysics 
The most controversial point of this discussion seems to rotate around 
the question of whether or not intentionality poses a separate ontological prob-
lem. Chalmers denies that intentionality poses such problems, but from the 
mental experiment proposed here it would appear to be a different situation. 
Intentionality seems properly qualified as the linking element that unifies the 
ontological and logical framework; and that does not allow the commitment 
to a logical consistency of zombies. This element, the horizon of the sense of 
subjectivity, reflects the radical character of the phenomenological framework 
29 Chalmers says much the same thing. See: http://consc.net/responses.html#kirk 
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which cannot be ignored in assessments that are often regarded as purely logi-
cal. This is actually the further argument I wanted to support through the men-
tal experiment. If the intention of asserting a truth content were eliminated 
from the case “P˄¬Q,” then we would have a consistent situation where an 
individual might respond coherently without any commitment to the discern-
ment of the conditions under which A rather than B is stated. We know that 
it would be perfectly conceivable in the case of a robot, the robot states what 
it states because a software program is designed to provide particular answers.
Therefore, the case of the robot, which is not a real case of “P˄¬Q,” is 
disregarded. It does not seem that there is any conceivable, consistent situa-
tion for which a “P˄¬Q” might have sufficient reason to make particular state-
ments, regardless of certain minimal evaluations and regardless of the intention 
to provide some response that we would consider rational (i.e. as significant) in 
the situation described. All this seems, if I’m correct, to characterize the major 
difficulty for the conceivability thesis.
5.1. Consciousness, unconscious and intentionality
I will now discuss two possible objections to the arguments submitted. At 
this point of the discussion, the supporters of functionalism might object to 
what is said stating that I have not given any proof that the utterance of true or 
false sentences is strictly subordinated to the conscious assessment of intention-
al states, or phenomenal content. If one accepts the thesis of the multiple realiz-
ability of the mental and admits that intentional states are expressions of the 
type of physical system functionally capable of implementing them, then one 
can conclude that an artificially made Z-Chalmers’ counterpart may genuinely 
manifest intentional behaviors when uttering the sentence “yes, I’m a zombie”, 
without the necessity of satisfying the condition that Z-Chalmers must also be 
conscious of these intentional states. This still means that, by not having well 
characterized the distinction between a human and a robot, my arguments are 
exposed to the objection that if the functionalists are right, then Z-Chalmers 
could very well be a natural automaton or a silicon counterpart capable of im-
plementing nontrivial intentional states on the basis of certain software, while 
being devoid of consciousness. If we assume that the intentional behavior is 
reducible to causal patterns of interaction between certain external events and 
physical brain processes, then we still have to admit - as any cognitive psycholo-
gist would - that behaviors which are coherent to the context could be imple-
mented by a neural system thanks to an innate software of which we might have 
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no access through introspection (the modularity thesis30). This type of reason-
ing is usually shared by the defenders of the computational theory of mind.
These are strong objections, all the same it is nevertheless possible to pre-
sent responses. First, I would like to point out that a behavior considered as 
“adequate” to the context cannot logically be considered an intentional behav-
ior, in the same way that the software Word cannot be considered to have an 
intentional state as it responds to input that I send from the keyboard to write 
the following and what has been written so far. The phenomenal aspect of the 
letters in Times New Roman is not the aspectual form of intentional states of 
the Word software. Furthermore, to admit that certain behavior of a physical 
system identical to ours might not require consciousness profoundly underesti-
mates our common and intuitive concept of “rationality”.
We consider a behavior “rational” on the basis of which there is (or will 
be if we decide to implement it) a subjective responsibility, i.e. the subjective/
conscious evaluation of intentional states with respect to a given context, and 
this is required for verbal utterances (true or false). But perhaps this definition 
does not help much. What, however, could help is what Searle discusses in The 
Rediscovery of the Mind31. I refer in particular to the “Connection Principle” 
(CP) and the concept of “aspectual shape” of intentional states (presented by 
Searle to answer the functionalist thesis) according to which intentional acts 
may be closely linked to the expression of unconscious brain events, i.e. process-
es of a computational nature that make it possible to exclude qualia from the 
framework of theories explicative of the mind, being characterized by purely 
syntactic-formal elements. Searle’s attempt to include aspects of phenomenal 
consciousness in the context of the conditions necessary to characterize inten-
tional states is what we are proposing.
First we have to characterize the CP. We admit that the intentional states 
of an individual, such as emotions, feelings and beliefs, are expressions of some 
type of neurophysiological activity. Searle’s CP states that under normal condi-
tions, any intentional state can be accessible to consciousness. This would be 
true for two main reasons. The first is that each intentional state, if genuinely 
intentional, has an aspectual shape defined by a particular type of intentional 
state for a particular individual who holds it in “private”. In other words, if 
S believes that P, and P is a genuine intentional state, then P is a subjective 
value that manifests through its aspectual shape, i.e. the intrinsically subjective 
30 Jerry Fodor is the main defender of this theory. See J.A. Fodor, The Modularity of Mind. An 
Essay on Faculty Psychology, The mit Press, Cambridge (MA) 1983.
31 J.R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, The mit Press, Cambridge (MA) 1994.
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means by which P is believed by S. Second, if there are not sufficient reasons to 
state the contrary, in normal conditions each intentional state can be accessible 
to consciousness, because the brain is (according to Searle) that kind of physi-
cal system that is “able to produce” consciousness. In other words, a physical 
system, if it is a neurophysiological system identical to ours, in conditions of 
normal operation realizes aspectual shapes of phenomenal consciousness – save 
for the principal of causal closure. As stated by Searle, whereas unconscious in-
tentional states are reducible to the physical states of the neurophysiological 
system, their intrinsic aspectual shape can be made explicit at a conscious level, 
thus dispensing the need to embrace some form of dualism. However, it’s nec-
essary to add another thesis to this one.
The aspectual shape of intentional states, according to Searle, is preserved 
(in the form of an objective value) in the neurological structure of individuals. 
This means that even the unconscious intentional states retain their aspectual 
shapes. From this, in principle, it follows that one day we may be able to iden-
tify the neurological aspects of an unconscious intentional state and thereby 
determine its aspectual shape (to establish the intentional state of a particular 
corresponding neuropsychological state). As I have understood Searle’s theory, 
it can be said that the objective characteristics of an unconscious intentional 
state correspond to the dispositional-causal elements that may (i.e. causally) re-
sult in a given type of conscious experience. Since the unconscious intentional 
states have a physical nature that preserves an aspectual shape characterizable 
to the level of conscious mental states, it follows that consciousness is a causally 
determined product of our neurological system. For reasons of brevity I will 
pause at this point on Searle’s theory. 
Now it is clear that the concept of aspectual shape could be rejected along 
with the idea that an aspectual shape exists at an unconscious level, even if one 
is unable to bear reason on principle to deny that the concept itself could be val-
id and useful for science. Conversely, taking as valid the Connection Principle, 
what consequences can be drawn for answering the functionalist’s objections 
to the main thesis of this work? I will not repeat Searle’s answer to the zom-
bie case32, which relies on Quine’s indeterminacy of the translation argument, 
because I think that the Connection Principle and, in general, the doctrine of 
biological naturalism supported by Searle is an extraordinary opportunity to 
draw some radical conclusions about what non-reductionist materialism can 
offer in response to the functionalists.
32 Ibi, p. 163.
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I have adopted one a Searle’s analogies that I find very powerful, which 
features a kind of physicalism in which consciousness finds its natural place. 
Kripke’s lesson on essential properties, intended as the “Individuation Princi-
ple,” will also be kept in mind. The analogy compares consciousness as an aspect 
of the human neurological system in the same way that being liquid is an aspect 
of water. In both cases, it is about physical aspects reducible in terms of defini-
tion and not in phenomenal terms. What does this analogy allude to? It reveals 
something that Searle explicitly states elsewhere in the text, namely that con-
sciousness is caused by the elements characterizing the neurophysiological sys-
tem according to a micro-macro or low-high ratio33. So, starting with zombies, 
the premise of the entire discussion is that a zombie is a physical system identi-
cal to me, i.e. identical “molecule by molecule” and for all those material aspects 
reducible to the basic properties of physics; in addition, his neural system works 
exactly like mine. It follows that if Connection Principle is valid and the reader 
also keeps in mind Occam’s Razor34, then in the situation I have described, it is 
“impossible” for the Zombie in the mental experiment to give an answer (that 
is an expression of genuine intentional states) without a neuronal system which 
brings up to a conscious level the aspectual shapes that characterize the seman-
tic contents of utterances heard from the astrophysicist or those uttered by the 
zombie itself. In other words, if the zombie possesses genuine intentional states 
then, given the identity, even its states must have aspectual shapes (and pro-
vided that the identity is valid for all sets of physical properties causally super-
venient to basic ones) which must necessarily manifest themselves as characters 
of consciousness. All this challenges Cartesian argumentation. 
This reasoning contradicts the logical possibility of zombies, relying sim-
ply on the expression, “individual just like me,” a phrase that (if considered on 
the basis of Connection Principle) excludes the other part of the conjunction, 
i.e. “unconscious”. From now on, formally as well as metaphysically, we would 
say that the conjunction “P˄¬Q” is a contradiction in all the possible worlds. 
From this reasoning, would we perhaps be able to derive a regression of the 
zombie to a mere “potency” as in the Aristotelian sense? In other words, one 
could probably say that a zombie is such only to the point that it is non-think-
ing, i.e. only until a kind of neurophysiological activity takes place that, based 
on the very definition of “zombie”, must be identical to that of normal people. 
But it is clear that we do not do anything in a redefinition of “zombie” as such, 
33 Ibi, pp. 124 ss.
34 Keep in mind that, with the same physical condition is theoretically more expensive (in explana-
tive terms) to support the idea that my identical twin would be unconscious.
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and that, in any case, the answer would be negative because intentional states of 
the individual in question should have aspectual shapes even at the unconscious 
level (according to the reasoning).
At this point, one can argue that it is not at all obvious that intentional 
states should have aspectual shapes, especially if such attitudes are formal ex-
pressions, namely logical strings of symbols computed by software “blind” to 
semantic contents. I believe that this argument is irrelevant for two reasons. 
The first is that under normal circumstances intentional states have an aspec-
tual shape that determines the first-person ontology, and this is a fact. The sec-
ond reason is that even if such computational systems could be implemented 
by silicon counterparts, the corresponding computations (having no aspectual 
shape) could not be considered genuine intentional states. To explain it as Sear-
le, the behavior of such counterparts would be judged “as if” they were rational 
agents35, but the truth is that their behavior would be mechanical like that of 
much simpler machines, like a hydraulic system through which water flows.
This reasoning may be carried even further. Remember the analogy be-
tween the brain and consciousness and the liquid appearance of water. The 
phenomenal aspect of physical bodies (such as being liquid as in water or yel-
low as in gold) is causally supervenient for certain thresholds of realizability 
according to their microphysical properties. This calls into question the thesis 
of the multiple realizability of the mental aspect. In fact, we say that aspects 
from water such as being liquid, boiling at 90-100°C, as well as being colorless 
and odorless cannot be created using gold, silver or any other element other 
than oxygen and hydrogen and possessing the same boundary conditions. It’s 
also necessary to bear in mind that these aspects of water are not mere primary 
intensions, but features causally determined in a causally closed universe. At 
this point I wish to push beyond what Searle asserts in his work. If what I am 
stating is true, then it is very likely that a structure of silicon (i.e. a counterpart 
of any type of substance other than that of which I am actually formed) cannot 
be implemented by or capable of consciousness. Therefore, if Searle is right and 
his type of doctrine is the best defense that we have at our disposition, then it 
is very reasonable to assert that there cannot be counterparts of human beings 
35 Once again, the reasoning might be rejected stating that Searle does not provide sufficient and 
necessary criteria to establish that the intentional states – having aspectual shapes – are the only true 
intentional states. However, at least intuitively speaking, Searle’s argument is always better than the 
alternative, namely the idea that the material dispositions of an artificial hardware can implement truly 
intentional software.
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that are equipped with software capable of operating on states which we would 
define as genuinely intentional.
In other words, counterparts would act plausibly “as if” they were able to 
understand a biological speaker’s verbal utterances but in the absence of any real 
form of intentionality and thus without any reference to content. The software, 
or set of formal rules which they could have been given, would thus be behavioral 
dispositions, rules to allow mechanical response to environmental stresses, and 
not intentional states with aspectual shapes. So again, this too is to be considered 
unsatisfactory in regards to the idea of a zombie in its standard definition.
The concept that the material substrate is likely to significantly affect the 
feasibility of truly intelligent (e.g. intentional) systems is not generally con-
sidered problematic by functionalists. Perhaps this comes from the fact that 
reductionists often naively compare the computerized processes of a machine 
to cerebral processes without paying attention to the intrinsic value and de-
terminates that distinguish organic systems from inorganic ones; it is worth 
assessing the radical consequences of this version of materialism if for no other 
reason than the fact that no one up to now has succeeded in artificially produc-
ing genuine conscious systems, namely possessing intentional states. From an 
epistemological point of view, it does not seem at all reasonable to discard a 
priori such a possibility, arguing that thought experiments such as that of Put-
nam’s Twin Earth36 are de facto a demonstration of the genuineness of the type 
of reductionism defended by functionalists.
It is correct to take note that in the original version of the experiment, 
Twin Earth is not conceived as a counterfactual, but as a distant place in the 
known universe. However, even if one were to hold Twin Earth as a logical 
possibility, an obvious fallacy would be encountered. This fallacy is seen by ob-
serving that in this universe, bearing in mind the causal closure, it is not possible 
for the water on Twin Earth (XYZ)37 to have a microscopic structure com-
pletely different from the water (H2O) on Earth, subject to all the boundary 
causal interactions, such as phenomenal aspects and causal interactions with 
other biological systems (considered physically identical to those present on 
Earth). For example, Putnam suggests that on Twin Earth, water “tastes like 
water and it quenches thirst like water,”38 despite having a completely differ-
36 H. Putnam, The meaning of “meaning”, first published in K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind 
and Knowledge (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, n. 7), University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis 1975, pp. 131-193, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1975.
37 “XYZ” is the hypothetical chemical formula for the “watery stuff ” on Twin Earth.
38 H. Putnam, The meaning of “meaning”, cit., p. 140.
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ent microstructure. Personally I don’t know whether there are liquids other 
than water that quench in the specific sense of the term. There are many water-
based compounds such as beer or wine, but even in these cases the function of 
quenching thirst is accomplished by the H2O molecules, which is not trivial 
from either an epistemological or metaphysical point of view when deciding to 
set a thought experiment. To have a liquid analogous to water (H2O) for the 
assortment of truly relevant aspects for a physicalist analysis, we would have to 
conceive a universe completely different in its microstructure. But that would 
not be of any help for a defense of functionalism, because then we would not 
have any kind of epistemic access to relevant facts. These are my responses to 
some possible objections.
Conclusions
In evaluating Chalmers’ conceivability thesis, the very act of posing ques-
tions to an entity identical to us but unconscious serves to avoid all the weak-
nesses found when there is a commitment to assess the coherence of the mere 
concept of zombies. Inconsistencies also show up in the case of Kirk, who tem-
porarily violates the requirement that “P˄¬Q” be logically consistent. In so do-
ing, Kirk violates to all effects the premise, going from “P˄¬Q” to “P˄Q.” By 
contrast, an argument such as the one I have proposed aims to keep the discus-
sion around logical data from the premises of the topic, thus deriving from the 
main thesis the most important epistemological consequences. The utterances 
proffered by the hypothetical zombie, in each of the four cases, appear to violate 
both a logical and epistemological element that cannot be eliminated. 
If “P˄¬Q” is consistent, then there is no reason not to keep an epistemic 
window open in order to derive some immediate logical consequences on the be-
havior of a “so and so” individual. All the same, such logical consequences seem 
dramatically inconsistent with certain radical elements of our phenomenology, 
which is the foundation of the conceivability of anything. These elements would 
need to be considered basic so that “P˄¬Q” would remain consistent. As noted 
several times, the very possibility that sufficient reasons would be given to enable 
belief that the behavior of a zombie would be consistent also depends on the val-
ues  of truth and semantic contents, in other words, what such an individual could 
reasonably utter. Additionally, what a zombie could most likely never do, is to 
utter significant sentences on its condition or internal state as a zombie.
Similarly, if one decides to support the idea that a counterpart of silicon 
could be able to manifest intentional states, it is important to remember that 
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there are some theoretical difficulties which functionalism will inevitably come 
up against. This alone would seem sufficient argument for the idea that a zom-
bie is not logically consistent, at least not consistent in the strong version as 
presented by Chalmers, where only the qualia are irreducible to the explana-
tions of physicalism.
Abstract
The subject of zombies is one of the most discussed and controversial topics 
of philosophy of mind. In this paper I will first examine the main argument of 
zombies, providing a summary of the current discussion. Then I will introduce 
a thought experiment, an epistemic window on a metaphysical scenario. By the 
thought experiment I will argue that zombies are logically impossible. Further I 
will discuss another recent epistemic window. Finally I will provide some other 
logical consideration to prove that intentionality is not reducible to the cognitive 
functional aspects of the mind and that, moreover, the subjective recognition of 
semantic contents is necessary in order to consider as sensical the verbal behavior 
of a zombie.
